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掩お乙モガ肋βe  
Introduction  








take onathird alternative regime，e．g．Peggingthe RMBto abasket ofcurrencies？  
Thesequestionswillbediscussedinthispaper，foratimeframeworkofthenextfour  
years，WhichisatransitionalperiodforstructuraladjustmentsallowedtoChinaasa  
newmemberoftheWTO．   
InthelongruntheissueoftheRMB’sfu11convertibilityshouldbeunavoidable，aS  
the Chinese economy strengthensits position on theinternationaleconomic scene，  







GAT℃bychangingthe oldregime’s strongtint ofplannedeconomyinto anewone  
acceptabletotheIMFandGATT’sbasicrequirements．Themajorpointsofthisreform  
1ReportoftheWorkingPartyontheAccessionofChina，P・6  









Theforelgn eXChange settlement system operated by the centralbank was  




inreturn，theywere able to purchaseit with due procedure at authorizedforelgn  
exchangebanks，forsettlementoftradeandothertransactions・Asanexceptiontothe  
foreignexchange concentrationprinciple，foreign・fundedenterprises andindividuals  
WereallowedtoopenforeigncurrencydepositaccountsatdesignatedforelgneXChange  
banks．  
（c）EstablishmentofInterbankForeignExchangeMarket   
AninterbankforelgneXChangemarketwasestablishedinShanghaiinApril1994，  
COnneCtingonline major cities throughoutthe countrybythe networkofthe China  
ForeignExchangeTradeSystem（CFETS）．  
（d）prohibition ofCirculation ofForeign Currenciesin the Domestic Market，and  
AbolishmentofForeignExchangeCerti丘cates   
TheprlClnginforelgnCurrenCyandthe circulationofforeigncurrenciesinthe  
domestic market were prohibited・The circulation offoreign exchange certificates，  
Startedin1980，WaSSuSPendedattheendof1994，andthenwithdrawnbyJune1995．   
OnDecemberl，1996，ChinaacceptedtheobligationsofArticleVIIIoftheIMF  
ArticlesofAgreement・Asaresult，Chinawasnolongerableto，aCCOrdingtoArticleⅥII，  
Sec・2，〟without the approvalof the Fund，impose restrictions on the making of  
PaymentSandtransfersforcurrentinternationaltransactions”（givingChinaanIMF  
ArticleⅥⅠInationstatus）．priortotheacceptanceoftheobligations，ChinawasanIMF  
Article XIV nムtion（allowed to maintain，for a transitionalperiod，reStrictions on  
PaymentSandtransfers払rcurrentinternationaltransactions）．TheIMFcon且rmedin  
itsstaffreportontheArticleIVConsultationwithChinain2000，thatChinahadno  









exchange relatedissues，and to draftappropriate regulations and monitortheir  
COmPliance．  











levelof designatedforeign exchange banks（according toinfbrmation provided by  
foreignbanksinShanghai）．   





by tax authorities should be presented to banksfor paymentsforinvisible trade  
transactionsrelatedtocertaincapitalaccounttransactions．  




113   
anuptrendoftheRMB’srate，andtheotherafter1997，Whichhasseenadefacto丘Ⅹed  
exchangerateregime．Thecontrastingtrendofexchangeratesofficia11yunderthesame  
exchange rate reglme Should beinterpreted，takinginto accountinternationaland  
domestic economic environments and movements ofthe balance ofpayments．The  
RMB’s exchange rateis essentially contro11ed by monetary authorities，and  
StraightforwardlyreflectsthemonetarypolicyoftheChinesegovernment．  
人民元の名目相場と実質実効相場  
Chinese RMB Nominaland RealEffective Exchange Rate  
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（twinsurpluses），greatlyincreasingforeignreservesfromUS＄21．2bi11ionattheendof  







industries，and Chinese productsincreased their competitiveness even with the  
appreciationofthe RMBbothinnominalandrealterms．China’s GDPgrowthrate  
graduallyslowed duringthisperiod－12．6percentin1994，10．5percentin1995，9．6  
PerCentin1996，and8．8percentin1997－butremainedatahigh1evelnonetheless，  
allowingagenerousacceptanceoftheappreciationoftheRMB．   
O））DeFactoFixedExchangeRatePeriod  
For丘ve years between1997and2002，the RMB’s rate movedwithin a narrow  
rangebetweenRMB8．27andRMB8．28perdollar，underadefacto丘Ⅹedexchangerate  
reglme．Therangeof且uctuationduringthisperiodwasonlyO．1percent，andexchange  
rates were managed withextreme rigidity；COmpared withthe European Monetary  
Syste甲（whichmaintainedaquasi－nXedrateregimewithintheEUterritory）inthe  
1980s，WheretherangeoffluctuationwasinprlnCiple2．25percentinrelationto an  
assignedcentralrate．Looked at moreclosely，the RMB’srate againstthe US dollar  
moved mostly between RMB8．2800and RMB8．2770，Perfectly managed microscopic  
fluctuations to the third decimalplace，and havinglittle to do withan ofBcial  
explanationofaratedeterminedbysupplyanddemand．  




temporary de丘citin1998．The trade surplus slowly decreasedfrom the record of  
US＄46．6billionin1998to US＄34．O billionin2001．Amongcapitalaccounts，inward  
directinvestments once decreasedfromUS＄44．2billionin1997toUS＄38．4billionin  
2000，butrevivedtoincreasetoanotherpeakofUS＄52．7billionin2002．Theproblem  
was that untraceable capitalnight（recordedin errors and omissions，and other  
investmentitems）probablyreachedUS＄50billionfrom1997to1999．Asaresult，the  
CaPitalaccountrecordedasurplusofUS＄23billionin1997，ade丘citofUS＄6．3billionin  
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capitalnightstoppedin2001．   





















theWTO．   
In2001apositivesentimentontheRMBprevailedinthemarket，andinNovember，  
forthenrsttimetemporarily，theRMBshowedanewpricestructure，i．e．apremium  
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POliticalandeconomiccirclesloudlydemandedrevaluationoftheRMB，butleading  
figuresin the Chinese government stressedthe stability ofthe RMB，and never  
indicatedanypossibilityofsuchup－Valuation．  
2．CurrentIssuesinFinancialSector  



















COrPOrate gOVernanCe tO manage risks such as credit，market，OPerationalandother  
risks．  
Evenifthe negativelegacy ofNPLsinheritedfromtheformer state－Planned  
economyis detached鈷・Om State－OWned commercialbanks，Without appropriate risk  
COntrOIsystems and corporate governance，neWly emerged bad assets and business  
losseswillgivethemnochancetogainthecorporatestrengthandprontabilityneeded  
forlistingtheirstocks．  
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Thblel FinancialDataonIndustrialandCommercialBankofChinaandBankofChina  
Notes：  
・IndustrialandCommercialBankofChina且guresfor1999arequotedfromStandard＆   
Poor’s，“AnalysisofIndustrialandCommercialBankofChina，”December6，2000．The   
numberofemployeesoftheIndustrialandCommercialBankofChinaunder1999isdata   
払r1998．  
・BankofChina’s且guresfor2000arequotedfromthe2001annualreport，althoughthere   
are some diffbrencesbetweenthe2000and2001reports．Figuresfor1999arequoted   
fromthe2000annualreport．  
・Returnontotalassets＝Pre－taXPrO丘ts／Tbtalassetbalance．DenominatorsoftheBankof   
China’sreturnontotalassetsasof1999，2000，and2001，arereSPeCtivelytheaverage   
balanceof丘scal1999，balanceattheendof丘sca12000，andbalanceattheendof丘sca1   
2001．  
・NumeratorsofNPLratiosareloansclassifiedintheworstthreecategories（substandard，   
doubtfu1andloss）from among the且ve categoryloan classi丘cation system（normal，   
special－mention，Substandard，doubtfu1，andloss）．  
Sources：AnnualreportsandStandard＆Poor’shomepage  
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The totalassets ofthefour maJOr State－OWned commercialbanks amounted to  
RMB12tri11ion（asoftheendof2001），andaccountedfor55percentoftheaggregate  








NPLratiobyca．10percent，NPLs didnotactuallydecreaseatall．Apparentlythey  
COntinuedtoincreaseevenafterthe1996prohibitionofpolicyfinancesbystate－OWned  
COmmerCialbanks．TheNPLratiois25．37percentbasedontheformerFourCategory  




guarantees），amOunting to RMB846bi11ion，underwritten by thefour state－OWned  
COmmerCialbanksforfundingNPLstransfbrredfromthemtotheirassetmanagement  
COmPanies．Thesebondsaretoberegardedpotentiallyasdisguisedbadassets，andif  







NPLs via asset management companies has already been used up and no further 
transferofnewNPLsisscheduled．  
4肋ib，Ebonomk頻arts，January24，2002，andFebruary24，2002．  
5IndustrialandCommercialBankofChina’sbadassetratiosaredisclosedaccordingtobotholdand   
newclassificationsofbadloans：29．3percent（oldclassificationasofthe丘scalendof2000），34．43   
percent（newclassificationasofthe丘scalendof2000），25．71percent（01dclassificationasofthe   
鮎calend2001），and29．78percent（newclassincationasofthe鮎calendof2001）．  
6AccordingtoStandard＆Poor’sestimation，Chinesebanks’badassetratiofor2001and2002are   
both50percent，andtheirbadassetrecoveryratiofor2001and2002areboth15percent．These  
levelsaresameasthoseofIndonesia，andaretheworstinAsia．（Source：S＆Phomepage，“Low   
RecoveryRatesExacerbateProblemAssetsforBanksinEmergingAsia，”April17，2002．）  
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TbdecreaseNPLratios，e肋rtsareneededtodecreasethenumerator（NPLs）and  
increasethe denominator（totalassets）．Itis essential，Onthe onehand，tOWriteofE  
NPLs andtosuspendunpro丘tablehigh－riskloansforreductionofthe numeratoror  
limitationofitsincrease，OntheassumptionthatnomanlPulationofassetclassi丘cation  
ismadebyadditionalloansorothermeanstocoverarrearsofloanservices・   
Theoperatingprofitsofthestate－OWnedcommercialbanksarethemajorsourceof  
funds to write ofF NPLs，but much progress cannot be expected due to theirlow  
profitabilitylThepre・taXPrOfitratio（ratioofpre－taXPrOfittototalassets）oftheBankof  















Reserve deposits by丘nancialinstitutions atthe People’s Bank of China bear  
interest（1．89percent，identicaltothatofsix－mOnthtermdepositsasofFebruary20，  
2002）．ThebalancereachedRMBl，708．9billion，andthereservedepositratioroseto13  
percent，atthe endof2001，tWice as much asthe ofncialrequlrementOf6percent・  
LendinglS COnCentrated on corporateloans toforelgninvested enterprlSeS Ofgood  
standing，aSlistedin the Fortune500，and to state－OWned enterprlSeS Ofnational  
prlOrityin theinformation，telecommunications，and petroleum sectors，aS Wellas  
7People，sBankofChinaadmitssomeadditions（30percentasofend2002）totheregulatedinterest   
ratesofloansapplicabletosmall－tO－mediumsizedcorporations．Asnotedonthequotationlistof  
interestrates：“Anyenterprise，individualand丘nancialinstitutionwillhavethe righttorefuse   
paymentofthatpaofaninterestratehigherthanthenorm．ThePBCwillaccordingtolawpunish   
the relevantresponsibleinstitutions orindividuals thatviolate theinterest rate policies ofthe   
state，”（Source：PBC homepage，“PBC Tunes Down RenminbiInterest Rates of Financial  
Institutions，”February20，2002）．  
8Sources：PBChomepage，andFujitsuResearchInstitute，Page43．  
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mortgageandautoloansbackedbycollateral．Competitionforsuchcustomersofgood  






4，391loss－making companies（two－thirds of6，599de丘cit enterprisesin1997）into  
PrO丘table ones．9Positive払ctors contributing to raise profits ofSOEsinclude such  
temporaryelements as oilprice risesinthe petroleum sector andwaiveredinterest  
PaymentOfdebtsbydebt・equityswaparrangements，inadditiontorationalizationof  
business management andthe goodbusiness climate ofthe globaleconomy．Itisyet  






and corresponding to the actualdemand of the nationaleconomy and social  
development．For example，nationalconstruction prQjects obligate state－OWned  
COmmerCialbanksto丘nancethesameamountofmoneyasthatofgovernmentbonds  
issued for such prqjects．The People’s Bank of China continues strong  







Theimplementation offinancialpoliciesfor macro－eCOnOmic controlrequlreS a  
Well－developedshort－termmOneymarket．Policyintentionsthatareexpressedthrough  
9 Sources：Japanese Finance Ministry homepage，Ministry of Finance，Chinese Study Group，  
“ProblemsintheChineseFinancialandCapitalMarkets－DispositionofBadLoanAssetsandthe   
ReformofState－OWnedEnterprlSeS，”October19，2001．  
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openmarketoperations，COmmerCial－billrediscounts，andminimumreserveratiosbya  
centralbank areindirectly communicated to丘nancialtransactions of the private  
economyviamoneymarketinterestrates．Theefncientfunctionofmoneymarketisalso  






withitscenteratthe ChineseInter－bankMoneyMarketTrade CenterinShanghai，．  
Transactionsin money markets are dividedinto three maJOr CategOries：callloan  
transactions（inter－bankmoneylendingandborrowing），repOtranSaCtions（dealingof  
government bonds with short－term rePurChase agreements）and discounts of  
commercialbills．  
Repotransactionsarethemostactive，theirannualturnoverrapidlygrowingfrom  
RMBlO4．2 bi11ionin1998 to RMB4，013．3 billionin 2001．The amount of repo  








money markets are diverse，including ten joint－StOCk commercialbanks，urban  







endof1997to RMB511．2billionatthe endof2001，Whilethebalanceofdiscounted  
commercialbills rosefrom RMB58．1billion atthe endof1997to RMB279．5billionat  
theendof2001．ThePeople’sBankofChina’srediscountpolicyofcommercialbillswas  
reviewedin1998．The Chinese government tries to make more use ofthe o瓜cial  
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rediscount rate to expand commercialbi11s markets，but the balance remained only  
RMB65．5billionattheendof2001．  












Chinese money markets．Severalmeasures have beenimplemented，SuCh as the  
introduction oftheinter－bankforeignfund market，tO aCtivate the Chinese money  
marketsincethebeginningof2002，butthecreditrisksofmarketparticipantshinder  
itsexpansion．Formationofamarket・driveninterestratesystemisvitaltothefuture  









Same building asthe ChineseInter・bank Money MarketTrade Center，Shanghai’s  
Short－termmOneymarket．  
Foreign exchange transactions stayed stagnant since the establishment of the 
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Apri12002，theeurowasaddedtothemarket．ThetotalvolumeperdayisonlyUS＄297  




forelgn eXChange tradingislimited to spot transactions，With no outrightforward，  
swapsorderivatives（suchascurrencyoptions）inChinesemarkets．   
Thelowforeignexchangeturnoverisdueto（a）inconvenientmarketmechanisms  




Chinese governmenthasadoptedade払cto丘Ⅹedexchangerate system，alignlngthe  
exchange rate of renminbi against the US dollar within a very narrow range of 















market）．The People，s BankofChinainterveneStOkeeptherenminbi’sexchangerate  
againsttheUSdollarwithinarangeofO．3percentfromthereferencerate（theweighted  
averageofexchangeratesonthepreviousday）quotedeveryday．  
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Thble2 ChineseForelgnExchange，MoneyandCapitalMarkets  
：≡ヾ：：：：史ノン：：：－          ≡：≡＝‡二＝や’・ニプ：：二＝：  
Annual foreign 408  720  628  697  520  315  422  750   
exchangetTlrnOVer  
（US＄100ふillion）  
Annualvolumeof  n．a．  n．a．  
interbank money 
transactions  
Inter－bankcallloans  n．a．  □ n．a．  n．a．  n．a．  989  3292  6728  8082  
Inter－bankrepos   n．a．  n．a．  n．a．  n．a．  1042  4047  15782  40133   
Aggregate market 3640  3474  9842  17529  19506  26471  48091  43522  
valueoflistedstocks  
こ∩ ⊂十  
○ （つ   7．89  5．94  14．50  23．44  24．52  31．82  53．79  45．37  
粁 （乃  
Ofwhich，negOtiable  965  938  2867  5204  5745  8214  16088  14463   
stocks  
Government bond 2286  3300  
bal．  
ロコ  
○   
ロ  
0  1613  2400  3487  5121  6447  7383  8534  
PJ ∽  





One can hardly expect active dealings under the current market management  
SyStem，inwhichparticipatingbanks cannotbutbringonly凸nalpositions resulting  
from transactions dealt with customers on the previous day to the market for 
adjustmentwithothermarketparticipants．ThePeople’sBankofChinaintervenesby  





also due toits separationfrom overseas markets under the strict controlofcapital  
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under the current exchange controIsystem，Which requlreS authorizationfor such  
CaPitalaccounttransactionsfromtheauthorities．   
In hedging exchange risksitis a problem that noforwardforeign exchange  
transactionsareallowedinChineseforelgneXChangetradingcenters．Accordingtothe  
2001BISsurvey，SPOtdealingsaccountedforone－third（50percentin1992）oftotal  
worldwideforeign exchange dealings，While outrightforwards and swaps make up  
two－thirds，gradually ralSlng theirimportance．Since1997，the Bank ofChina has  
experimentally concluded with customersforward exchange contracts due within6  
months，but the volumeislimited because ofthelack offorwardforelgn eXChange  
marketforcoverdeals．InSeptember2002theConstructionBankofChinawasnewly  
admitted to offbrforward exchange services to customers，andthe remaining state  
ownedbanksarescheduledtofo1low．Asthemainfactordeterminingforwardexchange  





POtentiallylarge to avoid exchange risksinvoIvedinincreasinginternational  
transactions．WhentheforelgneXChange policylS eVentuallychangedbywideninga  
fluctuationband or adopting a new regime，it willbeindispensable to provide with  
marketinstrumentstohedgeexchangeriskssuchasforwardsandderivatives．Itisan  
urgentissuetoinstituteaforwardexchangemarketinChina．  
（3）MonetaryPolicyandIndependenceofthePeople，sBankofChina   
ThePeople，sBankofChina（PBC）isexclusivelyresponsible－aSChina’scentral  
bank－formonetarypolicieswithemphasisoncontrolofthemoneysupply（M2：base  
money＋demand deposits＋丘Ⅹed deposits）and maintenance ofa stable丘nancial  
SyStem．The PBC has been shiftingits basic policy techniques toindirect且nancial  
COntrOIsincludingopen marketoperations andofncialdiscount rate policy，reVOking  
SuChtraditionaldirect丘nancialcontroIs astheregulationofthetotalloanvolumes．  
Thisorientationofmonetarypoliciestowardindirect丘nancialcontroIsisclearandhas  
beenendorsedbytheTbnthFiveYbarPlan，butthere are stillproblemsinpractical  
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implementation．   
TheratioofmoneysupplytoGDP（1．31in1998，1．46in1999，1．52in2000andl．65  
in2001）is rapidlyincreasing，indicating potentialmonetary risks andinflation  
PreSSureSinthemediumtolongterm．10Thechangeofmoneysupplylargelydepends  






moneymarkets，Wheretheseoperations are carriedout，are Stillsosmallthatit［is  
unknowntowhatextent applicable policyinterestrates andthe adjustedvolumeof  
funds a鮎ct the credit attitudes ofcommercialbanks when they provideloans．The  
Ofncialdiscountratehasrelativelyminorimportaceunderthecurrentsystem，inwhich  
thePBCtotallycontroIsbothloananddepositinterestrates．Onetypicalexampleisthe  
CaSe，in which the regulatedinterest rates of deposits andloans werelowered，  
respectively；byO．25andO．5percentinFebruary2002，Whiletheofncialdiscountrate  
remainedunchangedat2．97percent（re－1endingrateswerelowered）（RefertoTable3）．   









for nationalconstruction projects，loans to smalland medium sized enterprlSeS and  
loanstofarmersunderthesma11creditloansystem．  
Tb maintain a stable丘nancialsystem，the PBC providesfunds not only to  
Small－Sized bankrupt 丘nancialinstitutions，but also to the asset management  
COmPaniesforthefourmajorstate－OWnedcommercialbanksbyre且nancingacquisition  











fourmajorstate－OWnedcommercialbanks．   

















GovernorDai：“After China’s entryintotheWTO，thebalanceofpaymentswill  
fluctuatesubstantially；andexchangerateswi11movemoreflexibly．”（Nibonheizal  
SninbLZqJanuary18，2001．）  
A乙好〟β吉堀2β♂J・－   
“Lookingahead，theyagreedthatagradualmovetowardgreaterflexibilitywould  
払cilitate China’s growingintegrationintothe world economy and the maJOr  
StruCturalchangesunderway…．Directorwelcomedtherecentgreateruseofthe  
existing trading band，and encourageditsfu1luseinthe period ahead．At an  
appropriatetime，thisshouldbefo1lowedbyagradualwideningofthebandandits   
linkagetoabasketofcurrencies．”12  
血ノ描出：l▼J（エゴ（フ此・●  
GovernorDai：“ThecurrentlevelofRMBrateis relativelyadequate．But，after  
China’s entryinthe WTO，the market mechanism shouldbe more reflectedon  
determiningexchangerates．AsfarastheRMB’sratecanbekeptstable，China  
shouldhavearate丘Ⅹingmechanismthatworksmoresmoothly．（Ebm∂皿元1h幼   
January16，2002．）  
亡ゐ刀びβり′J昂jり（汐ノ  
GovernorDai：“Wewillmakethe rangeoffluctuationofthe RMBappropriately  
widerfromnowon…．ThecurrentleveloftheRMB’srateisadequate．‥．The  









thepaceofcapitalaccountliberalization，andtheglobalfinancialenvironment．“13   
September9，2002：  
FinanceMinisterXiangHuaicheng：“The present managednoatingrate regime  
willbechanged（inamoreflexible one）infuture，butnotinforeseeable near  
future．”（InterviewattheUSTreasury，JubonkeLzalSbinbun，SeptemberlO，2002）  
（2）prosandConsofFixedandFloatingExchangeRateRegimesforChina   
AlthoughtheChinesegovernmentrepeatedlysaidthatinprlnCipletheexchange  
rateshouldbecomenexibleafterChina’saccessiontotheWTO，theirconcretepolicyis  










When choosing either a且Ⅹed orfloating exchange rate regime，thetheory of  
“irreconcilable trinity”must be takeninto consideration，Which states that onlytwo  
POlicyobjectivesamongthreecanbesuccessfu11yachievedatonetime：exchangerate  
Stability，freeinternationalcapitalmobility；andindependent monetarypolicy．China  
hasplacedpriorityonthestabilityoftheRMB（witha丘Ⅹedexchangerateregime），and  
PrOhibitedfreecapitalnows acrossbordersbyimposingstrictrestrictions oncapital  
account transactions，in order to maintain the effbctiveness ofthe People’s Bank of  
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Theadvantageofa丘ⅩedexchangerateregimeforChinaisthatitcankeepthe  
RMB’sratestableandpredictable．China’stotalexportsandimportsin2001recorded  
US＄509．8billion，and the trade dependency ratio（trade amounts÷GDP）should  
reach as highas50percent．The stability and predictability ofexchange rates are  
Criticallyimportantin economies witha hightrade dependency ratio．European  




As to disadvantages，丘rstly thelevelofthe丘Ⅹed rateis not necessarily an  
equilibriumexchangeratefortheRMB，andthereeasilycomesapressureforeither  
revaluation or devaluation．Secondly，in order to maintain theindependence of  
monetary policy；reStrictions on capitalaccount transactions are to beimposed，  
increasing costsfor both businesses and monetary authorities．Costsfor businesses  
includenotonlydirectcostsforclericalprocedures，butalsoopportunitycostsforlosing  
OPPOrtunitiesfor払vorablefund raising andinvestments．Thirdly，eXChange controIs  
Oftenbringoncorruptionandcapitalflight，eVadingregulations．  
During the course of the Asian currency crisis，COuntries withloose or no  






Viewpoint，the丘Ⅹed exchange rate regime untilnow has been a reasonable and  
appropriatepolicy．   
O））ManagedFloatingExchangeRateRegime  
TheIMF dividesfloating exchange rate regimes between“managed且oat”and  
“independentfloat．”“Managedfloat”isareglmebywhichacentralbanktriestokeep  
an ofncialrate stable，but often changesit due to balance－Of・PaymentS andforelgn  
reserves requlrementS．Chinais officially categorizedin this group．In the  
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toit．First，aSSumingthat capitalaccount transactions remain restricted，When the  
RMB’sratefloats，thebalanceofpaymentsisexpectedtoreachequilibriumaccordingto  
Changesin the externalcompetitiveness of the Chinese economy．As the export  
COmPetitivenessofChineseproductsstrengthens，andthetradesurplusexpands，the  
RMB’sratesappreciatetodecelerateexports，OnOnehand，andaccelerateimportson  
the other．Inthe medium tolong－termPerSPeCtive，StruCturalreform ofthe Chinese  
economy willbe promoted，andits competitiveness willimprove through this  





RMB’s rate willbecome unstable since the rates are determinedfundamentally by  
SuPPlyanddemandinthemarket，andthereisnoguaranteethatthemarketratewill  
COnVerge at alevelofequilibrium．Once capitalaccount transactions areliberalized，  
extreme volatility and misalignment of exchange rates could occur．Second，  
deregulationandliberalizationofcapitalaccounttransactionsmaygiverisetotherisk  








investments，andotherinvestments（loans，deposits，trade credits，andothers）．The  
itemsthat willbe substantially affbcted by China’s WTO accession willbe trade  
balances，SerVices，and directinvestments．Otheritems should only be affbcted  
indirectly（forexample，anincreaseininwardforeigndirectinvestmentsshouldexpand  





maintainits economic growth，eXPOrtS Willbe dependent upon severalfactors other  














China willconform with the principle of nationaltreatment offoreign－funded  
enterprises，andis graduallyimplementing regulations compatible with WTO  
COmmitments・Combined with theimprovement of generalskills and excellent，  
inexpensive workforces，China should o鮎r one ofthe world，s most advantageous  
locationsforindustry．   









investmentsto Chinawillcomplementthe decreaseinthe current accountsurplus，  
balancingtheexternalequilibrium・Ariskfactor，however，istheproblemofcapital  
flight・Thepossibilitycannotbe excludedthatthe capitalaccount mightfallinto a  
de且citduetothe reemergence ofcapitalflight，inspite ofsurplusinforelgn direct  
investments，if something unpredictable breaks out politically or socially and a  
PeSSimisticviewspreadsaboutthefutureoftheChineseeconomy．  









China’sbalanceofpayments structureislikelytochangesubstantiallyinafew  
years’time，fo1lowlngitsWTOaccessioninDecember2001．Therightsandobligations  
attachedtotheWTOmembershiparemainlyrelatedtotradeandservicesincurrent  
accounts，and directinvestmentsin capitalaccounts．Other capitalaccount  
items－POrtfo1ioinvestments，loans，deposits，andothercapitaltransactions－arenOt  
directly a鮎cted．Inotherwords，itis to be notedthatthe WTO accession does not  
require alteration or relaxation of existing strict restrictions on capital account 
transactions．  
China，sbalanceofpaymentsstructurehadbeenexpectedat丘rsttochangeintoa  
COmbinationofa smallercurrent（ortrade）account surplus and alargerinflow of  
foreigndirectinvestment．In2002，boththetradesurplusandinflowofFDIincreased．  
Asto the developmentinfuture，itis difficult to clearly predict the direction and  
magnitude ofchanges under current unstableinternationalpoliticaland economic  




de丘cit amounting to3percent ofGDIミand sti11the urban unemployment rateis  


























StreSS the maintenance of stability．Watching carefu11y how theforeign exchange  






moreimportant thanthe stabilityin the domestic economy and society．Inits stafE  





Bank ofTbkyo－Mitsubishicalculatedforthe author），the RMB’s exchange rate has  
movedasfo1lows：hadtheRMBchangeditspeggingcurrencyfromtheUSdollartoa  
basketofcurrenciesatthetimeofthelaunchingoftheeuroin1999，theRMB’srate  














currency basket，but this was notincludedin the Tbnth Five－Ybar Plan，16due to  
unsoIved problems concerning the currency component．The RMB’slinkage to a  
currencybasketislikelytobediscussedagalninfutureasoneoftheavailablechoices・  
The basket can be determined along the line of Chinese trade pattern and other 











136   
the start ofthe euro？The result ofsimulationis showninthefo1lowingchartthat  
indicates the REERofthebasket－Pegged renminbiwouldhavebeenlowerthanthe  
actualdevelopmentin the past three years．The REERindex（1990：100）ofthe  
basket・Pegged renminbias of the3rd quarter of2001，for example，WaS98．67in  





to aforeign currency at a single exchange rate．・Convertibility has two phases：  
COnVertibilityfor current account transactions stipulatedinArticle VIIIoftheIMF  
Articles ofAgreement，andfu11convertibilityfor alltransactionsincluding capital  
accounttransactions．  
（a）ConvertibilityforCurrentAccountTransactions  





Under the Bretton Woods system，theIMF Agreement and GATT were closely  
relatedin monetary and trade aspects to promotethe abolishment ofbarriers that  
hinderedtheexpansionofinternationaltrade．Onceacountrychangeditsstatusfrom  




imports quantitatively．Now that the Bretton Woods regime nolonger exists，the  
importance of the relationship of these two agreements may be debatable．The  
acknowledgementthatcurrenciesofIMF’sArticleVIIInationshaveconvertibilityfor  
currentaccounttransactionswithoutanyrestrictiononrelatedpaymentsisnormally  
understood as meaning atthe same time thatthere are noimport quotaslevied or  
permissionsnecessary．Thisunderstandingshouldstillbevalid．  









OVerSeaS PaymentSin RMBfor current account transactions（ofRMB－denominated  
trade andforeignremittances）．The RMBis currently not used at allfor overseas  
Settlements，WhichareconductedonlyinUSdo11arsandotherconvertiblecurrencies．  
Non－reSidents cannot receive the RMBfor payments ofexport and commissions on  
CurrentaCCOunttranSaCtions，nOrCantheyopennon－reSidentRMBaccountsatdomestic  
banksin China．The question whether the RMB willbe permittedin settlement of  
Current aCCOunt tranSaCtionsis animportantissuein predicting the policy ofthe  
ChinesegovernmentontheRMB’sinternationalizationinfuture．   
払）Fu11Convertibility十ALong・termGoa1   
0ncetheRMBgainsfu11convertibility；itwillbemadeaninternationalcurrency，  
SuCh as theJapanese yen and Hong Kong dollar，and bothChinese residents and  
non－reSidentswillbeabletobuy；Sell，andholditfreely．Liberalizationofbothcurrent  
andcapitalaccounttransactionswillcausedomesticandforelgnCaPitaltomovefreely  









the macro－eCOnOmic point of view，Sincethe Chinese economy willbe extensively  
integratedintotheworldeconomyincapitaltransactionsaswellastradesandservices，  
itis expected that，throughinternationalcompetition and disciplines demanded of  








but has not announced a specific schedule．17This objective can be achieved by  
liberalizingcapitalaccounttransactions，buttheobservationsofChineseleadershave  




Former Deputy Governor ChenⅥ1an Ofthe People，s Bank ofChina（currently  





“Inordertoliberalize capitalaccounttransactions，andto achievethe RMB’sfu11convertibility，a  
reasonablystrongnationalpower，amOderate丘nancialsystem，andareasonablystrongcapabilityof  
the government to manage the macro economy are needed．Atthe moment，Our COuntrylS nOt  
necessarily preparedfor meeting allthese requirements．Therefore，We Should take step by step  
measures，and should not hurry toliberalize capitaltransactions or achieve the RMB’s fu11  
convertibility．AfterWTOaccession，however，aSOurCaPitalmarketdevelops，andastradeanddirect  
investments ofoverseas capitalexpand，theliberalization ofcapitalaccount transactions and the  
RMB，sfu11convertibilitywillsurelyproceed．”（Ebcmomib肋劫February21，2002．）  
139   
rationalexchange ratelevel；second，the availability ofliquidityforinternational  
settlements，SuCh asforelgn reSerVeS；third，a SOPhisticated controIsystemfor the  
macroeconomy；andfourth，aSOundenterprisestructure．  
Tbachievethe丘rstoftheseconditions，theRMB’sexchangerate shouldbecome  
moremarket－Orientedandflexible．Forthesecondthereseemstobenoproblem，Since  
Chinahasthesecond－1argestforeignreservesintheworld，andhasforeigndebtswell  









directreceiveroffunds andafundamentalinfrastructure払ranationaleconomy．As  
capitalliberalization proceeds，the movement ofcapitalacross the border becomes  
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